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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
H. WILLIAM NALDER,
CATHERINE NALDER and
H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
8529

KELLOGG SALES COMPANY,
a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case was before this court on appeal from the
District Court of Davis County, Utah, as Case No. 8313.
The opinion in the former appeal reversed the trial court
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and ordered a new trial and was handed down on October
11, 1955, and is reported in 4 Utah 2d 117, 288 Pac. 2d
456. The facts in this appeal are substantially the same
as in the former appeal. This proceeding is an appeal
from the same court in which a judgment was rendered,
this time upon the verdict of a jury, in favor of the respondents and against this appellant.
The respondents will be referred to hereafter as
plaintiffs and appellant as defendant.
By its former opinion, this court ruled, that since
the defendant, Nalder, Jr., signed none of the real estate
mortgages which are, in part, the subject of this litigation, no judgment for damages for failure on the part of
the defendant to release such mortgages could be awarded
in his favor. Notwithstanding that mandate the trial
court made no attempt to differentiate between damages
flowing from the failure to release real estate mortgages
and defendant's failure to release chattel mortgages and
the jury was permitted to find the issue of damages in
Nalder, Jr.'s favor without regard to the law of the case
established by this court on that phase of the controversy.
This court further ruled on the former appeal that
Nalder, Jr. could have no award of damages based upon
the failure of defendant to release any mortgages for any
period after he ceased doing business as a turkey grower.
On the mistaken theory that the evidence upon retrial
showed that Nalder, Jr. was attempting to engage in the
turkey business during all of the time complained of by
the plaintiffs, the trial court permitted the jury to award
damages to him covering a period after which he had
ceased to engage in that business or attempted to do so.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We shall have more to say regarding this aspect of the
case hereafter.
Plaintiffs by this action seek recovery of alleged damages to their business as turkey raisers occurring in 19 52,
1953 and 1954. They assert damage was caused by the
failure of the defendant to release three chattel mortgages
signed by N alder, Sr. and N alder, Jr. and two real estate
mortgages executed by Nalder, Sr. and his wife and delivered to the defendant in connection with turkey financing agreements in 1949, 1950 and 1951. (Ex. A 1-3 and
A 7-8) A third real estate mortgage was also given to
defendant. (Ex. A 10) It was admitted by plaintiffs
without dispute that that mortgage_ was a valid subsisting
obligation which defendant was entitled to maintain of
record. It amounted to $6,555.12 plus $3,600.00 for
£it~}t~'fe advances.
The case was tried upon plaintiffs' contention that
because defendant did not release these mortgages, N alder,
Sr. and Nalder, Jr. were prevented from securing turkey
financing from other companies, thus preventing them
from raising the number of turkeys in 1952, 1953 and
1954, which they intended to and were capable of raising.
They declare that it was their intention to raise 14,000
turkeys in each of those years and that they would have
realized a profit of $64,850.40 which they lost as the
result of defendant's alleged wrongdoing. (R. 1-2) (Tr.
81-84, 296, 303, 305)

The record shows that plaintiffs never raised more
than 6,000 turkeys in any year, even with the identical
facilities which they now contend would have been used
by them to raise 14,000 turkeys. The record further shows
that during the three years preceding 1952, plaintiffs enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gaged in the turkey business at an overall loss. In none
of those years did the turkey business yield plaintiffs any
substantial profit.
Defendant denied the alleged wrong and that plaintiffs had suffered any damage by reason of anything done
or omitted by defendant, and counterclaimed to foreclose
its third real estate mortgage. (Ex. A 10) (R. 3-10)
Since no attempt was made by plaintiffs to contest the
amount owing defendant on its counterclaim, defendant
was awarded judgment for the full amount demanded,
including attorneys' fees. The amount thus granted to
defendant was deducted from the jury's verdict of $22,030.61 and judgment was finally entered in favor of
Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr. for the net amount of $14,739.09 plus $150.00 penalty. (R. 16) It is from that
judgment and other rulings of the trial court that this
appeal is prosecuted.
At the conclusion of the evidence defendant made a
motion for a directed verdict. The court took the motion
under advisement (Tr. 514-517) and after verdict and
judgment on the verdit, denied the motion. (R. 18)
Within the proper time after judgment defendant
filed its motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict,
or for a new trial. ( R. 17) Those motions were likewise denied. ( R. 18)
In addition, on March 27, 19 56, the court granted
plaintiffs' motion to retax costs which defendant claimed
by a cost bill filed December 10, 19 55, following reversal
in the former appeal. (R. 23) The court struck from
defendant's cost bill on appeal the items of $682.84 which
was the cost of the supersedeas bond required on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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former appeal and $19.80 charged for the filing of the
record on appeal.
It is undisputed that prior to 1949 Nalder, Sr. made
preparations to go into the turkey business. Neither he
nor his son, H. William Nalder, Jr., had engaged in that
business before that time. (Tr. 21) In that year Nalder,
Sr. and Nalder, Jr. entered into a partnership and commenced business. (Tr. 22, 23) They were financially
unable to carry on business without credit. For each of
the years 1949, 1950 and 1951 they entered into contracts
with defendant, whereby, in exchange for their agreement to use defendant's turkey feed preparations, defendant agreed to advance the price of turkey poults and
the necessary feed to grow and mature them for market.
Exhibits B 2 and B 3 constituted the contract for 1949
and the contracts for 1950 and 1951 contained the same
provisions except for the necessary variations of amount
and year.
To secure the defendant for its advances Nalder, Sr.
and Nalder, Jr., each year for the three years in which
defendant provided the financing, signed and delivered
to defendant promissory notes evidencing advances made
by defendant and secured those notes by chattel mortgages upon the turkeys and the machinery, feed and
equipment used in the business. Those chattel mortgages
are part of the record as Exhibits A 1, A 2 and A 3.
It is not disputed that defendant provided all of the
plaintiffs' required financing for 1949, 1950 and 1951. ·
In addition to chattel mortgage financing the defendant provided supplemental financing for which real
estate mortgages were taken as security upon the real
estate of Catherine N alder. (Ex. A 7-13 ) This was necesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sary because the chattel mortgage financing was insufficient to mature the turkeys and was furnished by
defendant upon plaintiffs' request.
For the sole purpose of creating the impression with
the jury that defendant was oppressive in its dealings with
plain~iffs and did not act in good faith, plaintiffs contended that the defendant exacted notes and mortgages
exceeding the actual amounts advanced to them. The
contention is that defendant demanded notes and mortgages in double the amount actually requested or needed.
(Tr. 56,150) As a matter of fact, prior to September
14, 1949, plaintiffs requested an additional $2,000.00 and
offered real estate in the name of Mrs. N alder as security.
Because it was anticipated that additional funds might
be needed, a mortgage was taken for $4,000.00. (Ex. A 7)
(Tr. 363,365,367) Under that mortgage not $2,000.00
but $5,500.00 was actually advanced. (Tr. 369) (Ex. E)
In April, 19 50, another real estate mortgage was
taken on the same property. (Ex. A 8) Prior to that
date defendant had made advances to plaintiffs in the
amount of $6,721.80 which was in addition to chattel
mortgage financing and that real estate mortgage was to
secure those additional advances. (Tr. 141,370) (Ex. E)
Nevertheless, H. William Nalder denied having received any advances under that mortgage. (Tr. 57)
Again on August 15, 1950, a real estate mortgage
was taken to secure anticipated further advances of
$3,600.00 (Ex. A 10) Under that mortgage over $3,600.00
was advanced by defendants. (Tr. 371) (Ex. E) It was
the sworn testimony of the plaintiffs that the third real
estate mortgage was given for the sole purpose of merging the balance due from the 1949 indebtedness which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amounted to $6,555.12 and upon a promise that all prior
mortgages would be released. (Tr. 60-62, 214-215, 216)
Timely objections were made to that evidence and were
overruled by the court notwithstanding there was no foundation showing that the defendant's agent who was purported to have made the promise had any authority to
make it and in the face of testimony and evidence that he
had no such authority. (Tr. 60, 214, 44-54, 3 39) (Ex.
c 4, 5, 6, 7.5, 8)
In none of the years that the plaintiffs raised turkeys
with the aid of defendant's financing were they able to
make a substantial profit. The operation in 1949 resulted
in a loss of over $6,000.00 (Ex. C 4, 5. Ex. D 4, 8. Ex. E)
(Tr. 65, 69) In 1950 they succeeded in repaying all advances made for that year and about $1,000.00 over, which
was applied on the 1949 deficit. (Ex. D 4, 8. Ex. E)
(Tr. 69) In 1951 they were even less successful. They
made only about $400.00 more than the total cost of that
year's operation. (Ex. E) In 1951 in a letter written to
defendant the plaintiffs confessed themselves as failures
in the turkey business. (Ex. D 4)
In no year did the plaintiffs ever raise more than
6,000 turkeys. Yet in this case they would have the court
believe it was their intention and that they actually would
have raised 14,000 turkeys had defendant not prevented
them from getting the necessary financing. The only year
in which they made any attempt to get financing for
14,000 turkeys was 1952. (Ex. G 2 and H 1)
At the end of 1951 defendant declined to finance
plaintiffs any longer. Plainti'ffs had failed to substantially
reduce the amount of their indebtedness from the 1949
operation. In addition, irregularities were, discovered in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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their dealings with defendant. They had sold turkeys
covered by defendant's 1951 chattel mortgage and had
not accounted for the proceeds. (Ex. D 4-8, D 11-13)
(Tr. 66) As a matter of fact they have never fully accounted to defendant to this day for all of the turkeys
which they illegally sold. (Tr. 379, 149) They knew perfectly well that they had no right to sell those mortgaged
turkeys or to divert the proceeds to other uses than the
payment of their obligations to defendant. (Ex. D 4, 5)
(Tr. 68, 148, 218, 219) They made a full written confession of their wrongdoing in November, 1951. (Ex. D 4-8)
The money they received from those sales was used to pay
claims of other creditors who were pressing them for payment or threatening to take judgments. (Ex. D 4, 5)
(Tr. 68, 70, 148) At the trial the plaintiffs tried to make
it appear that those turkeys had been sold because by so
doing they were able to get more money for them. (Tr.
66, 146) On cross examination they were forced to admit
the real motives behind their actions.
It was for those reasons plus the fact that defendant
could no longer provide the type of financing which plaintiffs required that defendant declined to finance plaintiffs
any longer. (Tr. 423, 458)
Late in the fall of 1951 a conference was held between Mr. and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. and Messrs. Williams and
Aust representing the defendant. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the liquidation of the amount owing
defendant. The meeting took place in the Hotel Utah. The
Nalders claim that when the subject of 1952 financing
came up for discussion Mr. Williams not only refused
to extend further credit, but went further and threatened
that he would prevent the Nalders from getting credit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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from anyone else. (Tr. 73, 74, 80, 151, 222, 230) Mr.
Williams and Mr. Aust both emphatically deny such a
threat. (Tr. 423, 424, 458) If made and carried out it
would have almost certainly forever foreclosed the only
hope which defendant had of ever getting its money and
defendant well knew this to be so. (Tr. 461) The obvious
purpose of the accusations made by the plaintiffs was
again to make it appear to the jury that defendant was
guilty of bad faith. The evidence clearly demonstrates
that no such threat to plaintiffs' credit was ever made.
The record shows that the plaintiffs themselves are
not in unity about the matter of a threat having been
made. H. William Nalder, Jr. wrote a letter to defendant
couched in extreme opposite terms than his parents testified. (Ex. D 14) In that letter he states that his father
told him that defendant would permit other financing arrangements to be made by plaintiffs and asks the defendant
to confirm the understanding. Furthermore, he testified
to the same effect. (Tr. 324, 325) Yet H. William Nalder,
Sr. denied under oath that he ever told his son the very
thing which H. William Nalder, Jr. wrote to defendant
about. (Tr. 151) Responsive to that letter defendant confirmed its willingness to permit other financing and expressed its willingness to subordinate its claim to anyone
willing to provide financing. That offer was repeatedly
renewed and was never withdrawn. (Tr. 152) (Ex. D
16-23) (Tr. 299, 324) Defendant attached as a condition
to its agreement to subordinate that plaintiffs pay $352.00
which represented the value of mortgaged turkeys which
had been wrongfully delivered to a service station operator
to satisfy an unpaid account for gas and oil which Nalder,
Jr. owed and had failed to pay. (Ex. D 17, 19) (Tr. 154,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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155, 301, 302, 323, 325) The plaintiffs not only recognized the condition to be reasonable but attempted to
comply with it. Furthermore, there was an exchange of
perfectly friendly correspondence after this alleged threat
was made. (Ex. D 10.5, 21.5)

During the trial the matter of the efforts of plaintiffs to secure other financing was testified to at great
length. It appears that Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr. made
separate and individual applications to different feed
manufacturers. It was asserted that this was done in the
full knowledge that if made jointly the applications would
have been refused. (Tr. 296)
In 1952 Nalder, Jr. made an application to Farmer's
Grain (Ex. H) and one to the Pillsbury Company. There
is in the record absolutely no evidence as to why those
applications were rejected. (Tr. 305, 322, 323) Consequently, there is no proof that they were rejected because
defendant did not release its mortgages.
Also in 1952 another application was made by Nalder,
Jr. to General Mills (Ex. F) and there is considerable evidence as to why it was not approved. It requested financing for 5,000 turkeys, not 14,000. (Ex. F 1) Many unfavorable factors are revealed by the record and are graphically portrayed in Exhibit F 6. It is conceded that one of
the conditions for approval was a release or subordination
of defendant's mortgages. But in addition the matter of H.
William Nalder, Jr.'s credit reputation was seriously questioned. (Tr. 111, 122) Also his involvement in litigation
and a poor paying record and other n1ortgages and debts.
(Tr. 117, 122-124) Furthermore, he was to be strictly
limited in his operations to 5,000 birds, not 9,000 which
he con tends he was going to raise. ( T r. 115, 121 ) In adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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clition, a guarantee which was an absolute requirement for
approval was never obtained by him. (Tr. 115, 116, 126,
127, 13 3) Mr. Stevens, credit manager of General Mills,
was called by plaintiffs and despite counsel's repeated
efforts to get him to do so he refused to state that Nalder's
application would have been approved if defendant had
released or subordinated its debt. (Tr. 128) The record
does not support the contention that the application
would have been approved if defendant had released its
mortgages. It is significant to note that the turkey processor with whom the plaintiffs had done business for two
or three years would not advance even $352.00 to Nalder,
Jr. in order for him to get a subordination from defendant. (Tr. 302, 324) Here was a man who knew the plaintiff as well as anyone who had no confidence that he would
get his money back even if he loaned them only this small
amount.
The record is likewise clear that Nalder, Jr. abandoned any further efforts to finance turkeys after 1952.
(Tr. 309) In spite of such abandonment the jury was permitted to find that Nalder, Jr. was damaged in turkey
operations in the years 1953 and 1954 because defendant
did not release its mortgages.
We turn now to the credit applications made by
Nalder, Sr. to Ralston Purina Company in 1952, 1953 and
1954. The application of 1953 was not produced but he
testified it was for 1,300 to 2,000 turkeys. (Tr. 156, 204)
The exact number is indefinite.
He had attempted to get financing for 5,000 turkeys
in 1952 (Ex. G 2) but when this was not approved he
reduced his request hoping it would be approved and in
1954 his application was for only 2,000 turkeys (Ex.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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G 3), not 5,000 or 14,000. The evidence is that in 1953
and 1954 he tried to get :financing for no more than
2,000 turkeys. Here again we point out that despite this
evidence the plaintiffs were permitted to go to the jury
upon the theory that they intended to raise 14,000 turkeys
in 1952, 1953 and 1954 and that they would have been
successful except for defendant's alleged wrongdoing.
The record indicates clearly that the applications of
Nalder, Sr. to Ralston Purina were rejected for much the
same reasons that Nalder, Jr's. application was denied by
General Mills. They were: ( 1) Bad credit rating and
pending litigation. (Ex. L 11, 13, 14) (Tr. 96, 478-82,
499, 508, 509) (2) Lack of character and reputation.
(Ex. L 15) ( 3) The existence of other mortgage in(4) All other factors afdebtedness. (Tr. 492, 493)
fecting credit. (Tr. 499, 510, 511)
It was not the existence of unreleased Kellog mortgages which was responsible for the denial of credit applications. (Tr. 497, 500) That a release or subordination of defendant's mortgages would have been necessary
in the event the application was accepted is not disputed.
(Tr. 483, 492) The evidence is that these applications
were denied solely because Nalder, Sr. was considered to
be an undesirable individual to do business with. He did
get financing for 1,000 to 2,000 turkeys in 1952, 1953
and 1954, but only upon a guarantee of his obligation by
Rasmussen, his feed dealer. First Security Bank would not
accept him upon the strength of his own credit reputation
or assets. (Tr. 271, 272)
It is undisputed that credit men do not deny credit
applications because an applicant may have unreleased
mortgages outstanding in any amount. Of much greater
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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importance is the amount of the debt which underlies
such recorded instruments. Unreleased mortgages are only
an indication of the existence of a possible debt which an
applicant may owe. (Tr. 119, 122, 125, 322, 388, 459,
460)
We cannot pass this phase of the case without alluding to the record of false and incomplete credit information supplied by N alder, Sr. to Ralston Purina. He signed
the financial statements, which are Exhibits G 1 and G 5,
certifying that they were complete, accurate and truthful.
The only indebtedness which he disclosed was to Deseret
Federal Savings & Loan Association. He made no mention whatever of the debt owing defendant nor did he
mention the existence of numerous chattel and real estate
mortgages and judgments outstanding to other creditors.
He knew the information contained in his application
was untrue. (Tr. 157-163, 165-168, 169, 170) He excused his conduct in this regard by stating that he notified Wheelwright, a Ralston Purina Agent, of the existence of those debts and omitted them upon Wheelwright's
suggestion and advice. Significantly he failed to call
Wheelwright to testify in corroboration of this statement.
The existence of those mortgages and judgments,
many of which had not been released or satisfied when
the applications for credit were made, is amply supported
by the record. (Tr. 572-575, 491, 275-283) They total
some eighteen separate items. Many of them were unreleased at the time of trial.
One of the important issues in this case is whether a
demand was ever made by plaintiffs that defendant release its mortgages, assuming that they had been paid and
satisfied and plaintiffs were entitled to releases, which de-
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fendant specifically denied. The record is bare of any evidence that any demand was ever made for a release of the
real estate mortgages. Furthermore, with respect to the
real estate mortgages the record shows conclusively that
plaintiffs were not entitled to releases. The mortgages
dated April 1, 1950, and August 15, 1950, (Ex. A 8,
A 10) both expressly provided that they were to secure
all indebtedness then existing or accruing thereafter by
all the plaintiffs to the defendant until the same was paid
in full. The debt owing to defendant never having been
paid in full those mortgages were never in fact satisfied
and hence defendant was under no obligation to release
them. Those mortgages totaled $13,276.92. The validity
of the mortgage of August 15, 1950, (Ex. A 10) is conceded. The jury was permitted to take into account the
fact that the mortgage of April 1, 1950, (Ex. A 8) was
not released as a basis for damages.
No demand for release of chattel mortgages was made
prior to 1954. (Tr. 208-213, 241, 257) The only evidence
even remotely resembling a demand prior to 1954 is contained in the testimony of Nalder, Jr. (Tr. 318) The most
that can be said for his testimony is that on that occasion,
November, 1950, the subject of a release was discussed.
That discussion pertained to a settlement of the 1950 account and the record clearly shows that the defendant's
agent, Mrs. Schinker, advised that no mortgages would be
released until authorized by defendant's general manager.
(Ex. C 9, C 10) (Tr. 314, 315, 318, 338, 339, 342) Mrs.
Schinker had no authority to releaese mortgages or to
commit defendant to make a release. It is not even pretended that any other demand for a release of chattel
mortgages was made after November, 1950, and until
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1954. (Tr. 320-322) Hence there is no evidence of any
demand ever having been made to release the 1951 chattel mortgage (Ex A 3) which was for $42,825.00 In the
absence of this vital evidence the jury was permitted to
find issues in favor of plaintiffs that defendant's failure
to release chattel mortgages was unlawful and could form
the basis for an award of damages. Releases of the chattel
mortgages were executed January 21, 1954, and they were
filed March 11, 1954. (Ex. A 4-6) (Tr. 456-7)
In connection with the subject of a demand for release the plaintiffs asserted that they had been led to believe that all but the third real estate mortgage (Ex. A 1 0)
had been released. They assert they first made the discovery
that this had not been done in 1954. (Tr. 208-213, 241,
257) The documentary evidence will not support the
plaintiffs in this assertion. They were advised in writing
as early as February, 1952, and as late as June, 1953, that
the mortgages had not been released and could not be
released until they accounted for the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged turkeys. (Ex. D 14,
D 21.5, D 22, D 23) Exhibit C 10 advised the plaintiffs
that the mortgages dated before December, 1950, would
not be released until approved by defendant's general manager.
Defendant in retaining all of its mortgages of record
was acting in accordance with its usual business practice
and policy of not releasing any mortgages until indebtedness owing it was paid in full. This policy was adopted
and in use at the time in question upon the advice and instruction of counsel. Counsel had advised the defendant
that the release of any mortgages prior to the full payment of indebtedness would jeopardize defendant's rights.
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(Tr. 336, 337, 357, 377, 432-434, 448, 449, 451, 462)
Certainly animosity or desire to injure plaintiffs played
no part in defendant's decision not to release these mortgages. (Tr. 461) Defendant acted in good faith in what
it did.
During the trial numerous objections to the introduction of evidence and the propriety of counsel's questions were raised to no avail. Also exceptions were taken
to several of the court's instructions and his refusal to give
requested instructions. These matters will be referred to
and discussed hereafter.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF,
H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR., FOR DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED
WRONGFUL FAILURE TO RELEASE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES AND IN PERMITTING THE INTRODUCTION OF
EVIDENCE THAT SAID PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN OR ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE IN THE TURKEY BUSINESS AFTER
MAY OF 1952 CONTRARY TO THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF
THE CASE.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS,
H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR.,
BECAUSE OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO· RELEASE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES BECAUSE
NO DEMAND OR REQUEST FOR SUCH RELEASES WAS
EVER MADE AND FOR THE AD'DITIONAL REASON THAT
SAID PLAINTIFFS NEVER PAID OR OTHERWISE DIS-
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CHARGED THE OBLIGATIONS SECURED BY SAID MORTGAGES.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY PERMITTING THE JURY TO AWARD 'DAMAGES FOR DEFENDANT'S
FAILURE TO RELEASE CHATTEL MORTGAGES: (a) BECAUSE NO DEMAND FOR RELEASE WAS MADE PRIOR TO
1954. (b) BECAUSE EACH CHATTEL MORTGAGE SECURED
THE PRIOR UNPAID DEBT OF PLAINTIFFS, H. WILLIAM
NALDER, SR. AND H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR. HENCE, NO
RELEASE COULD BE DEMANDED. (c) BECAUSE THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE THAT SAID PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT HAVE
SECURED FINANCING IN 1954 AFTER THE RELEASE OF
SAID CHATTEL MORTGAGES ON MARCH 11, 1954. (d)
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT
PLAINTIFF, H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR., ABANDONED THE
RAISING OF TURKEYS IN 1952 AND NEVER ENGAGED
IN THE TURKEY BUSINESS THEREAFTER. (e) BECAUSE
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF, H. WILLIAM
NALDER, SR., OBTAINED FINANCING IN 1953 AND 1954
ON ALL TURKEYS FOR WHICH HE MADE ANY APPLICATION FOR FINANCING.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN APPLYlNG AN IMPROPER RULE OF DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS>
CLAIM OF LOSS OF ANTICIPATED PROFITS FOR THE
YEARS 1952, 1953 and 1954.

POINTV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN RECEIVlNG IN EVIDENCE PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS 1-1, I-2, Q, R and
N 1-4 FOR THE REASON THAT SAID EXHIBITS WERE INCOMPETENT, IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL AND NO
PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THEIR ADMISSION
IN EVIDENCE.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO RELEASE EITHER
REAL ESTATE OR CHATTEL MORTGAGES WAS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY LOSS TO PLAINTIFFS, H.
WILLIAM NALDER, SR. OR H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR.

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT'S jUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES
THAT DEFENDANT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH.

POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OVER DEFENDANT'S ORJECTION THAT SCOVILLE AND SCHINKER PROMISED OR
AGREED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE
MORTGAGES WITH NO PRELIMINARY SHOWING OF
AGENCY OR AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH PROMISE AND
FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT UNCONTROVERTED
TESTIMONY ESTABLISHES THAT SCOVILLE AN'D SCHINKER
HAD NO SUCH AUTHORITY.

POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT OR FOR A NEW TRIAL.

POINT X
THE COURT ERRE'D IN CERTAIN OF ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AND IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE CERTAIN OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.
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POINT XI
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING CERTAIN ITEMS
OF DEFENDANT'S COST BILL ON APPEAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF,
H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR., FOR DEFENDANT'S
ALLEGED ~RONGFUL FAILURE TO RELEASE
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES AND IN PERMITTING THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE THAT
SAID PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN OR ATTEMPTED
TO ENGAGE IN THE TURKEY BUSINESS AFTER
MAY OF 1952, CONTRARY TO THE ESTABLISHED
LAW OF THE CASE.
In its opinion in the former appeal in this case,
4 Utah 2d, 117, 288 Pac. 456, this court stated:
uNalder, Jr. did not sign any of the real estate
mortgages and consequently, any award to him for
the Kellog Company's failure to release these mortgages is without basis. Nor can he recover damages beyond the period when he actually engaged
in, or tried to engage in, the turkey business."
This court further found upon the record in the
former appeal that:
uln 1952 Nalder, Jr. was unable to obtain financing for further turkey raising and turned to
other pursuits. Nalder, Sr. was unable to obtain
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financing upon his sole credit but obtained co-signers and participated in turkey raising upon a limited
scale in 1952, 1953 and 1954. His success during
these years was used by the trial court as the basis
for determining the amount of damages awarded,
not only to Nalder, Sr. but to Mrs. Nalder and
Nalder, Jr., as well. This was error, as was the
court's failure at any time to distinguish between
Nalder, Sr., Nalder, Jr. and Mrs. Nalder upon
any of the basic requirements for a cause of action
based upon wrongful failure to release mortgages * * :-'" "
None of the real estate mortgages involved in this
case were executed by Nalder, Jr. (Ex. A 7, A 8, A 10)
Although this court explicitly and unmistakably ruled
that Nalder, Jr. could not recover for defendant's failure
to release real estate mortgages, the jury was nevertheless
permitted to consider this fact as a basis for awarding
damages to Nalder, Jr. Because no attempt was made by
the trial court in instructing the jury to differentiate
between a failure to release real estate and chattel mortgages in determining the question of damages as applied
to Nalder, Jr., it is submitted reversible error was committed.
·The language of this court above quoted, recognizes
the highly penal nature of Sec. 57-3-8, U.C.A. 1953
upon which plaintiffs must base their right to a judgment in favor of Nalder, Jr. The statute is explicit in
its ter1ns in allowing damages only to mortgagor. Since
Nalder, Jr. executed none of the real estate mortgages it
must inevitably follow that he may claim no damages
for defendant's failure to release them. Nor does it aid
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gages were given by Mrs. Nalder to secure the partnership obligations of Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr. the penalty for wrongfully failing to release them must inure
to the benefit of N alder, Jr. as one of the partners.
Neither Nalder, Jr. nor the partnership were the mortgagors, hence, Nalder, Jr. does not come within the provisions of this statute.
This court also determined in the former appeal that
Nalder, Jr. abandoned the turkey raising business in 1952.
In an effort to escape from the effect of that decision
and to justify a judgment on his behalf, the plaintiffs were
permitted to testify that N alder, Jr kept an interest in
the turkey business by actively participating in the limited
turkey operations of Nalder, Sr. in 1952, 1953 and 1954,
even to the extent of sharing in the profits and losses of
Nalder, Sr. for those years. Defendant objected to this
testimony on the ground that it was a repudiation of the
testimony which plaintiffs had given at the former trial.
(Tr. 29 3) This situation was fully pointed out to the
trial court, whose rulings appear at pages 201-202 of the
transcript. The testimony at the former trial is found
at pages 192-197 of the transcript.
Furthermore, the uncontroverted testimony still is
that in May of 1952 Nalder, Jr. com~enced working
for the Grolier Society. (Tr. 306) In the spring of
19 53 he was selling books in California and in June of
1953 he began working full time for the Utah Sand and
Gravel Company during all of the time which he would
have devoted to raising turkeys. (Tr. 193) He continued
on this job without interruption until the time of the
former trial. (Tr. 194) Also, Nalder, Jr. made no attempt whosoever to get any turkey financing after 1952.
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(Tr. 309) He made no joint application for financing
with Nalder, Sr. disclosing any partnership with his
father anytime after 1951. (Tr. 296) In the face of this
testimony and against the decision of this court, it is submitted the trial court erred in permitting Nalder, Jr. to
claim a continuation of the partnership after 1951.
The trial court, aided by the insistence of plaintiffs'
counsel, also permitted the jury to consider the pretended success of Nalder, Sr. in 1952, 1953 and 1954 as
the basis for assessing damages awarded to Nalder, Jr.
This court, in the language above quoted, declared such
action on the part of the trial court on the former trial,
to be error. Since this same error was again committed
a reversal of the judgment is required on the same
ground.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
PERMITTING THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES
TO H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND H. WILLIAM
NALDER, JR. BECAUSE OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO RELEASE REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGES BECAUSE NO DEMAND
OR REQUEST FOR SUCH RELEASES WAS EVER
MADE AND FOR THE ADDITIONAL REASON
THAT SAID PLAINTIFFS NEVER PAID OR
OTHERWISE DISCHARGED THE OBLIGATIONS
SECURED BY SAID MORTGAGES.
In 56 A. L. R. at page 337 it is stated:
u.A notice or request
enter a satisfaction or
mortgage is a condition
action for the penalty."

to the mortgagee that he
execute a release of the
precedent to a right of
(Citing cases)
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In the record now before the court there is no evidence
that defendant was ever requested by the plaintiffs to
release its real estate mortgages. In fact, no such demand was ever made by plaintiffs. The cases are well
settled on the prosition that such a demand must be made.
See 56 A. L. R. 3 37 supra. See also International Harvester ·Co. v. Simpson, (Ala.) 13 3 So. 4, applying this
rule to chattel mortgages.
Statutes of the kind similar to 57-3-8, UCA, 1953,
relied upon by plaintiffs, are highly penal in character and
are to be strictly construed. The courts are practically
unanimous in their reluctance to enforce such statutes
until mortgagees have had every reasonable opportunity to
comply with their provisions. This court has construed
the Utah Statute in the case of Shibata v. Bear River
State Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P. 2d 251, and has held
that the section is penal and must be strictly construed.
A fact of. even greater significance, which the trial
court totally ignored, is that the record shows that the
real estate mortgage of April 1, 1950, (Ex. A-8) was
never satisfied, hence plaintiffs at no time had a right to
demand a release. In that mortgage, this provision was
inserted:
ccin addition to the foregoing amount of
$6,721.8 0 this mortgage shall secure all other
sums due and to become due from H. William
Nalder, Sr. and Catherine Nalder, his wife, and
H. William Nalder, Jr., and Mrs. H. William
Nalder, Jr., his wife, in favor of Kellogg Sales
Company.''
At the time that mortgage was executed, plaintiffs,
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Nalder, Sr. and Jr., were indebted to defendant for the
amounts recited in said mortgage. It should, therefore,
be evident that by the express terms of the mortgage the
plaintiffs could not require a release until all indebtedness owing to the defendant had been paid in full. Never,
at any time, have the plaintiffs attempted to deny that
they owed defendant amounts secured by this mortgage
and the trial court so found. (R. 16) In addition, the
1949 real estate mortgage (Ex. A 7) was never satisfied
because the debt owing, which was secured in part by
that mortgage, was never paid. Hence, the plaintiffs were
not entitled to demand its release. It must, therefore, be
apparent that the judgment awarded by the court for the
failure to release real estate mortg~ges cannot stand, because the conditions which would have entitled the plaintiffs to the relief under the statute relied upon did not
exist.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY
PERMITTING THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE
CHATTEL MORTGAGES: (a) BECAUSE NO DEMAND FOR RELEASE WAS MADE PRIOR TO 1954.
(b) BECAUSE EACH CHATTEL MORTGAGE SECURED THE PRIOR UNPAID DEBT OF PLAINTIFFS, H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR., HENCE, NO RELEASE COULD
BE DEMANDED. (c) BECAUSE THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE THAT SAID PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT
HAVE SECURED FINANCING IN 1954 AFTER THE
RELEASE OF SAID CHATTEL MORTGAGES ON
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MARCH 11, 1954. (d) BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE
CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF, H.
WILLIAM NALDER, JR., ABANDONED THE RAISING OF TURKEYS IN 1952 AND NEVER ENGAGED IN THE TURKEY BUSINESS THEREAFTER. (e) BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS
THAT PLAINTIFF, H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR.,
OBTAINED FINANCING IN 1953 AND 1954 ON
ALL TURKEYS WHICH HE MADE ANY APPLICATION FOR FINANCING.
Section 9-1-4, UCA, 1953, provides:
((After the full performance of the conditions
of the mortgage any mortgagee, agent, assignee
or legal representative who shall wilfully neglect,
for the space of ten days after being requested,
to discharge the same shall be liable to the mortgagor or his assigns in the sum of $50 punitive
damages and also for all actual damages sustained
by such neglect or refusal."
The record in this connection shows that no demand was ever made for the release of chattel mortgages
until 1954. (Tr. 208) By the unequivocal terms of the
statute which this court has said, in ruling upon the companion statute requires strict construction there can be
no penalty assessed for failure to release until after demand. Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, supra. Notwithstanding this fact, the jury was permitted to award
Nalder, Sr. and Jr. a judgment for purported loss of
profits sustained in 1952, and 1953, which losses, if sustained at all, were suffered prior to any demand for a
release having been made. It must be apparent, there-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
fore, that the judgment in this respect is fatally defective.
Releases of chattel mortgages were executed on the
21st of January, 1954, and were recorded in the office
of the clerk of Davis County, Utah, March 11, 1954.
(Ex. A 4-6) It is submitted that there is no evidence
that these plaintiffs sustained any damage for failure to
release chattel mortgages between the time when the demand was made and the time when the releases were
placed of record. The releases were filed before the beginning of the 1954 turkey season and there is no scintilla of evidence by which it was shown that the chattel
mortgages were not released in time for plaintiffs, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, to have secured financing
for their 1954 operations. The record shows (Ex. I 1)
that the plaintiffs' 1951 turkey poults were delivered
April 3, May 4 and May 11, 1951, respectively, and Exhibit E 1 shows that the turkeys raised in 1949 were
not hatched until April 29, 1949, and Exhibit E 3 shows
that the turkeys raised in 1950 were hatched May 1
and May 7 respectively and Exhibit E 5 shows that those
turkeys raised in 1951 were hatched March 9 and May
10, respectively.
The trial court permitted a judgment for Nalder,
Sr. and Jr. for alleged damages sustained in 1952, 1953
and 1954. Each of the chattel mortgages under consideration contained this provision:
uProvided that if the mortgagor shall pay or
cause to be paid unto Kellogg Sales Company or
its assigns the indebtedness above set forth on demand as evidenced by his note or notes, together
with interest as therein provided and shall further
pay or cause to be paid subject to the further and
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future indebtedness whether evidenced by promissory note or not as the mortgagor may hereafter
incur to the mortgagee, it being the intent h~ereof

to secure the said mortgagee any advance or credit
now made or hereafter made ::· ::· * or any other
advancement or credit extended * * * "
Thus, by the very terms of these chattel mortgages
they were given to secure existing indebtedness no matter
how originating. It is undisputed in the record that there
was unpaid indebtedness going back to the inception of
the business relationship between the parties.
The law is well settled that taking a new chattel
mortgage in the absence of intent does not satisfy a preexisting indebtedness. Pacific National Agricultural
Credit Corp. v. Wilbur, Cal., 42 Pac. 2d 314:
((The acceptance of the new note and mortgage as a renewal of the former note and mortgage, in the absence of evidence of any agreement
that the new note and mortgage should be accepted in payment and satisfaction of the old,
does not operate as an extinguishment or discharge
of the latter."

Mego1vn v. Fuller, Wyo. 266 Pac. 124, involved a
whole series of chattel mortgages given over a period of
many years. The Supreme Court of Wyoming held in
that case that each new mortgage was a renewal or continuance of the previous one and was intended to secure
the original debt which was never paid, even though the
amount varied from time to time. Likewise see Loop
Discount Corporation v. Holleb fS Co., (Ill.), 47 N. E.
2d 337.
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tel mortgage taken by it included the past due and unpaid debt of Nalder, Sr. and Jr., and that consequently
no right to demand a release of any chattel mortgage existed, even assuming that a proper demand for release
was made, until the debt secured by those mortgages was
paid in full, including the amount still unpaid from the
1949 operations of the mortgagors. Certainly, in view
of the record, there never existed any right to a release
of the 1949 chattel mortgage and we contend the same
construction must be applied to the chattel mortgages
given in 1950 and 1951 as well. Plaintiffs attempted to
escape the consequence of their failure to pay the amount
due under the 1949 chattel mortgage by contending that
defendant promised in exchange for their agreement to
execute the real estate mortgage of August 15, 1950,
(Ex. A-10) that the 1949 chattel mortgage would be
released. Defendant denied any such agreement and we
shall discuss under another heading of this brief why
plaintiffs' contention is untenable.
The record conclusively demonstrates that Nalder,
Jr. abandoned the business of raising turkeys in 1952.
The record shows that he went to other pursuits in that
year and never returned to turkey raising. He made no
efforts after 1952 to get financing, either individually or
jointly, with H. William Nalder, Sr. He also abandoned
the ranch which he had leased for the purpose of raising
turkeys and either sold or returned to his seller the equipment which he claims he was going to use in such operations in 1953 and 1954. (Tr. 306-309, 192-197) This
being so it must necessarily be concluded that Nalder,
Jr. vol un taril y made it impossible for himself to raise
the 14,000 turkeys which he states he intended to or
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could have raised in those years. Since the verdict and
judgment in this case permitted a recovery for him for
1952, 1953 and 1954 lost profits, it necessarily follows
that there is no evidence which can or does support this
judgment and for this reason the case requires a reversal.
Similarly, Nalder, Sr. was awarded a judgment upon
the theory that he too suffered damage in 1953 and 1954
because he and his son were prevented from raising 14,000
turkeys. Inasmuch as the facilities necessary to raise that
,.,ere
number of turkeys w;a.s voluntarily surrendered by N alder,
Jr. in 1952, it likewise follows it could not have been
and was not the intention of either Nalder, Sr. or Nalder,
Jr. to raise the claimed number of turkeys as represented.
The record further shows that no application made in
those years by Nalder, Sr. requested financing for more
than 2,000 turkeys. (Ex. G 3) (Tr. 15 6, 2 04) He and
Rasmussen testified that his unsuccessful efforts to obtain
financing for 5,000 turkeys on his 1952 application had
discouraged him and led to reduced applications in
1953 and 1954. (Tr. 207, 265) Nevetheless, with the
aid of Rasmussen, his feed dealer, he actually obtained
all the financing in those years which he made any attempt to get. (Tr. 264, 265, 271, 272) Nalder, Sr. claims
he did not know why his applications were being rejected and certainly he did not at the time they were
made and rejected, attribute the rejection to defendant's
unreleased mortgages. In this state of the record it is
apparent that no attempt was made by either Nalder,
Sr. or Nalder, Jr. to raise 14,000 turkeys in 1953 or 1954,
hence, no claim to damages can possibly be predicated
upon the assertion that in those years plaintiffs would
have raised that number of turkeys. The record shows
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a complete abandonment of the business by Nalder, Jr.
and a voluntary reduction in the applications made by
N alder, Sr. for financing. In either case the judgment is
entirely unsupported by any competent evidence sustaining the extent of the damage claimed.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
APPLYING AN IMPROPER RULE OF DAMAGES
TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF LOSS OF ANTICIPATED PROFITS FOR THE YEARS 1952, 1953 AND
1954.
In order to sustain a judgment in their favor the
plaintiffs were required to show that as a result of defendant's wrongful conduct they sustained damage. Loss
of profits like any other damage must be proven before
any recovery may be had for such a loss. The same rules
of certainty and definiteness apply to a claim of lost
profits as apply to any other type of damage. Also, conjecture, speculation and guessing are as objectionable in
proving such losses as they would be in any claim for
damages.
It is conceded that loss of future or anticipated
profits is recoverable in a proper action. The following
authorities support this proposition:
States v. Durkin, (Kan.) 68 Pac. 1091
Schultz v. Wells Butchers' Supply, (Wash.) 275
Pac. 737
Outcault Advertising Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank
of Emporia, (Kan.) 234 Pac. 988
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However, the rules do not permit a claimant to recover. such a loss by merely claiming that except for the
interference of defendant profits would have been so
much money. A claimant must establish a basis for his
claim in order to recover. The requirement is that of
proof with reasonable certainty.
Claims for loss of anticipated or future profits by
their very nature are speculative and uncertain. The general rule applicable to damages is that in order to be recoverable they must be certain. See Restatement of the
Law of Torts, Section 912; Steiner v. Long Beach Local
No. 128, (Cal.) 123 Pac. 2d. 20; Grupe v. Glick, (Cal.)
160 Pac. 2d 832. In the latter case the following statement was made:
uAn award of damages for the detriment occasioned by the loss of future profits is subject to
the general rule that the amount which, except
for the defendant's wrongful act, would have
come to the plaintiff, must be certain and must
have been within the contemplation of the parties
when they contracted."
See also Blakely Printing Co. v. Fort Dearborn Mercantile
Co., (Ill.) 53 N.E. 2d 55 and Krikorian v. Dailey, (Va.)
197 S.E. 442 at page 448:
((Profits may only be recovered where they can
be ascertained with reasonable certainty."
The rule applying to such cases, as the above authorities clearly demonstate, is that any loss of future
profits must be related to the experience of the claimant
prior to the time of the commission of the wrongful act.
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The Restatement of Torts, Section 912, page 578 states
the rule as follows:
uAs a condition to recovery for loss of earnings, the person harmed must offer evidence, convincing to the trier of the fact, that a substantial
amount of earnings has been lost. To do this he
must introduce evidence of the amount of earnings received Prior to the time of the injury, or
the amount which he was capable of obtaining,
and at least some evidence having a tendency to
show that he could have earned something during
the period in which loss of earnings is claimed."
A leading case on this subject is Williams v. Island
City Mercantile fS Milling Company, (Ore.) 37 Pac. 49.
That case involved a claim for loss of future profits growing out of breach of contract. Among other things, the
court says the following:
uwe are of the opinion, therefore, that the
true measure of damages for the failure to complete the contract within the time stipulated, and
for the loss of time occasioned by the attempts of
plaintiffs, after September 20th, to comply with
the terms of their contract, is the reasonable value
of the use of the mill during such time, as ascertained from the past experience of the defendant

***"

uThe ruling announced by the court as the
measure of damages is the difference between the
actual and guaranteed capacity of the mill was,
we think, correct because it was based upon past
transactions; * * * "
See also:
Chain Belt Co. v. U. S., 115 Fed. Supp. 701
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William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters
of the United States, 42 Fed. 2d 152
Shell Oil Co. v. State Tire & Oil Co., 126 Fed.
2d 971
This court in the case of Jenkins v. Morgan, (Ut.)
260 Pac. 2d 532 at page 535 quotes with approval the
case of Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Products Co.,
122 Wash. 220, 210 Pac. 366, 367, as follows:
before special damages for loss of
profits to a general business occasioned by the
wrongful acts of another may be recovered, it
must be made to appear that the business had been
in successful operation for such a period of time
as to give it permanency and recognition, and that
such business was earning a profit which could be
reasonably ascertained and approximated."
cc ::·

::·

::·

In U. S. v. Griffith, Gornall fS Carman, Inc., (lOth
Circuit), 210 Fed. 2d 11, it was said:
uThe loss of future profits from a regularly
established business may in proper cases be established by showing that the profits after the wrong
are less than past profits. 25 C. J. S. Damages,
Sec. 90 (citing other cases) * ~· ~- ."
The evidence is undisputed that in the years prior
to 1952, when there was no interference from the defendant and when in fact the defendant was financing the
plaintiffs to the full extent of their operations, their business was a failure. We quote from the plaintiffs' own
statements regarding their business operations. On November 21, 1951, they wrote defendant as follows:
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It surely looks bad for us again * * *
You also know without me telling you, that we
have made nothing since we went into the turkeys
u

***

~..

**

.

uif we had sold them here when processed we
would have been able to pay Kellogg all we owed
him and had $800.00 over, but as it was we went
$6,000.00 in the hole. * * *
uThe next year (last year) we were able to
pay Kellogg Company all of last year's bill and
$1,000.00 on interest.
uMr. Williams, this year the way we had to
feed was also a very costly lesson to us. Our feed
bill this year will be more than $6,000.00 above
what it was last year ::· * ::- ." (Ex. D 4)
Again on April 5, 1952, they wrote the defendant as
follows:
u

* *

~· You may say rightly that they have

not been good years

***"

(Ex. D 9)

In those three years plaintiffs were unable to pay off
the 1949 debt owing to defendant. Did they show as
this court in Jenkins v. Morgan, supra, states they must
show ((that the business had been in successful operation
for such a period of time as to give it permanency and
recognition, and that such business was earning a profit
which could be reasonably ascertained and approximated?" The record shows exactly the opposite. The
turkey raising business, to paraphrase the case of W illiams v. Islaud City Mercalltile f5 Milling Co., supra, is
even more speculative than the milling business and to
permit these plaintiffs to come into court and testify
that in 1952, 1953 and 1954 they would have raised
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14,000 turkeys and marketed the same at so much profit
per bird was the purest kind of speculation and was in
no way related to their past experience of earnings or the
extent of their past operations. It is consequently submitted that the judgment rendered cannot stand or be
sustained and that the same should be reversed.
Furthermore, the rule is there can be no damages
recovered for anticipated or future profits to be derived
from a business only in contemplation in the owner's
mind or which is unestablished. In Jenkins v. Morgan,
supra, this court stated:
c:c:All the authorities are unanimous in holding
that prospective profits to be derived from a business which is not yet established but one merely
in contemplation are generally too uncertain and
speculative to form a basis for recovery."
See also:
Chain Belt Co. v. United States, supra
Grupe v. Glick, supra
Krigorian v. Dailey, supra
Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128, supra
15 Am. Juris. page 573, Sec. 157
25 Corpus Juris Secundum, P. 518, Sec. 42 (b)
Eastman Kodak Co. v. So. Photo Material Co.,
295 Fed. 98
Ellerson v. Grove, Circuit Court of Appeals, 4th
Circuit, 44 Fed. 2d 49 3
Andreopulos v. Peresteredes, (Wash.) 163 Pac. 770
Goebel v. Hough, 2 N.W. 847, (Minn.)
Blankenship v. Lanier, (Ala.) 10 1 So. 7 6 3
Central Coal Co. v. Hartman, Ill Fed. 9 6
Whitehead v. Cape Henry Syn. (Vir.) 68 S.E. 263
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Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Red Iron Drilling
Co., Inc. (La.) 192 So. 895
Mensing v. Wright, (Kan.) 119 Pac. 374
Landon v. Hill, 29 Pac. 2d 281, (Cal.)
It is submitted that from the evidence in this record
there was no established business damaged by the acts
of defendant, even admitting for the purpose of argument only, that they were wrongful. Consequently,
there can be no damages awarded in favor of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs testified that in 1952 they had capacity
to hold and care for 14,000 turkeys and that they would
have raised that many birds if financing had been available. They asserted they would have duplicated the same
number in 1953 and 1954 and the proof was that in
1952, 1953 and 1954 they never raised in any year more
than 2,000 turkeys. We have already pointed out that
Young Nalder in 1952 completely abandoned turkey
raising as a business and that Nalder, Sr. in 1953 and 1954
curtailed his applications for credit and we have already
made the observation also that in no year had they ever
raised more than 6,000 turkeys. We submit that the jury
was permitted to speculate upon the theory contended
for by the plaintiffs and that even the speculation upon
which the jury was permitted to act had no basis or
foundation in fact.
POINT V

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
RECEIVING IN EVIDENCE PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS 1-1, I-2, Q, RAND N 1-4 FOR THE REASON
THAT SAID EXHIBITS WERE INCOMPETENT,
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IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL AND NO
PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THEIR
ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE.
Under the next preceeding argument of this brief
we have stated our reasons for asserting that the court
erred in awarding damages to plaintiffs for loss of anticipated or future profits because there was no relationship
between the damages awarded and the plain tiffs' experience in the turkey_ business prior to the alleged interference by defendant. We now wish to make comment
upon the exhibits which the court received over the objection of defendant upon which a determination of
damages was made.
Exhibits I-1 and I-2 were taken from the books and
records of Lee Brown Processing Company. They were
admitted upon the testimony of Keith McMurdie who
identified himself as plant manager and field man for
the Brown Company. At page 3 5 of the transcript appears the following testimony:

Q. I show you what has been marked as Exhibit I-1 and ask you if you can tell me
just what it is? Don't give me any information from it. Just what is that?
A. This is our - this must be a photostatic
copy of our ledger sheet. Out of our records.
Q. Is there any question about it being a ledger
sheet? Some question about a photostat,
but,A. This is a duplicate, I suppose, of our ledger
sheet.
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The same kind of testimony marked the foundation laid
for the admission of Exhibit I-2. (Tr. 37) There was no
testimony that these exhibits were the records of the
Brown company kept under the supervision and control
of the witness or that they were true or correct or that the
witness knew them to be true and correct. Furthermore,
they were not the original books of account but were
copies. This hearsay evidence was admitted by the court
over the well-founded objections of the defendant. (Tr.
36, 328)
Exhibits Q and R also purported to be documents
taken from the :files of the Lee Brown Processing Company and they were not identified by any witness from
the Brown company as being correct or as kept under
his supervision and control or that the witness knew them
to be correct. Exhibits Q and R, on the other hand, were
admitted on the testimony of Nalder, Sr. who merely
stated that they had been received by him in connection
with a settlement which he had with the Lee Brown
Company. Both Q and R were the rankest of hearsay not
even possessing the inadequate qualifications of Exhibits
I-1 and I-2. (Tr. 326, 327)
Based upon Exhibits 1-1, 1-2, Q and R, the court
admitted in evidence plaintiffs' Exhibit N 1-4 which consituted the computations of the alleged profits which the
plaintiffs contend they would have made based upon
14,000 turkeys in 1952, 1953 and 1954. There having
been no foundation laid to receive any of the exhibits,
which were all hearsay, the evidence of lost profits, even
if otherwise acceptable, was inadmissible and the judgment based upon these computations and exhibits must
necessarily be erroneous. (Tr. 330, 331, 334)
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Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol. 1, Sees. 48, 59,
pages 789, 794
Nichols Applied Evidence (1934 Supp.) Sees. 48,
53, pages 10 3, 104
Meredith, et al v. Bitter Root Valley Irrig. Co.
(Mont.) 141 Pac. 643, page 648
Ogden Packing and Provision Co. v. Tooele Meat
and Storage Company, 41 Ut. 92, 124 Pac.
333
Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 96
Ut. 331, 85 Pac. 2d 819
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT'S FAILURE OR
REFUSAL TO RELEASE EITHER REAL ESTATE OR
CHATTEL MORTGAGES WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF ANY LOSS TO PLAINTIFFS, H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. OR H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR.
The judgment in this case rests upon the unsupported
conclusion of plaintiffs that the reason for their inability
to obtain turkey :financing for 1952, 1953 and 1954 was
that the record in the county recorder's office in Davis
County, Utah, showed the real estate and chattel mortgages, pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, unsatisfied and unreleased. Plaintiffs asserted their complete ignorance of
the condition of this record until notified by Rasmussen
in 1954. (Tr. 208-213) The record does not support
plaintiffs in this claim of ignorance. They were notified
in wrtttng by defendant that the mortgages were not
released in 1950. (Ex. C-1 0) Furthermore, the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiffs carried on correspondence with defendant in 1952
and 19 53 requesting subordination of defendant's debt.
(Exs. D13, 14, 16-23) (Tr. 244-257) They could hardly
be ignorant of the fact that the requirement of a subordination agreement by General Mills Company was for the
purpose of clearing the record of these mortgages and
to constitute the General Mills obligation a :first lien. In
a memorandum dated December, 1951, reference is made
to unreleased chattel mortgages which would have to be
released or subordinated. (Ex. F 4) Presumably this subject was discussed with Nalder, Jr. for he made several
attempts to get defendant to give him such a subordination. (Ex. D 17, 19) (Tr. 154, 155, 301, 302, 323) See
also Exhibit F 8. Furthermore, plaintiffs well understood
the purpose of a subordination agreement. They requested defendant in 1950 to subordinate defendant's debt
to the :first mortgage on their home, which request defendant granted. (Tr. 56-57) This pretended lack of
knowledge by plaintiffs is unconvincing and not very significant except that it gives a good insight into plaintiffs'
willingness to slant testimony to their own advantage.
The important question pertains to the actual reasons
why plaintiffs' applications for financing were denied and
the equally important question as to whether the evidence
shows that defendant's conduct was the proximate cause
of plaintiffs' inability to get financing.
The burden of proving damage from defendant's
failure to release mortgages was always upon the plaintiffs.
Defendant contends that the proof submitted does not
sustain this burden and that the verdict and judgment
entered must be reversed.
Plaintiffs' counsel, contrary to the theory upon which
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he t:i~\is case that defendant's failure to release mortgages was the sole cause of plaintiffs' alleged damages,
requested that the jury be instructed that more than one
proximate cause may exist in an action for damages and
that the defendant's acts did not need to constitute the
sole proximate cause in order for plaintiffs to recover,
and that concurrent acts of two wrongdoers combining
to cause injury do not excuse a defendant from liability.
The court, included these requests in the charge to the
jury as instructions No. 16 and 18. These instructions
were grossly erroneous because insrtuction No. 18 assumed, without any proof, that a wrong had been committed by some third party in refusing to accept plaintiffs' credit applications. Instructions No. 16 misconceived the burden of proof resting upon the plain tiffs.
N alder, Jr. testified that he made an application to
the Pillsbury Company and Farmers Grain of Ogden.
These applications were denied and there is no pretense
of any proof as to the reasons why they were denied, or
that the defendant's unreleased mortgages caused their
rejection. (Tr. 305, 322, 323) Nalder, Sr. also stated that
he had tried to get the Pillsbury Company to approve an
application but he had not the remotest idea of why his
request to that company for credit was not accepted.
In 19 52 N alder, Jr. made an application to General
Mills for financing for 5,000 turkeys. (Ex. F-1) The application was never approved and no reason was ever
given by General Mills for its rejection. There is nothing in the record which sustains the claim that this refusal was because of defendant's unreleased mortgages.
It is not disputed that one of the requirements made by
General Mills was for a release or subordination of the
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debt owing to defendant. (Ex. F 8) It is also a fact that
defendant never executed such a release· or subordination.
That it offered repeatedly to do so is established beyond
question. (Tr. 152, 299, 324, 325) (Ex. D 14, 16-23)
Defendant did make its offer conditional upon payment
of $352.00 which represented a sum which Nalder had
received as a credit for delivery of mortgaged turkeys to
a service station operator. Nalder, Jr. recognized that
this condition was reasonable and attempted to comply
with it. (Tr. 154, 155, 301, 302, 323, 325) (Ex.
D 17, 19)
Plaintiffs would have the court accept these facts as
proof that the unreleased mortgages were the cause of
General Mills' refusing to finance Nalder, Jr. in 1952.
These facts, however, fall far short of proving proximate
cause. In the first place, the General Mills credit representative who appeared at the trial and testified for plaintiffs refused to testify that this application would have
received favorable consideration even if defendant had
either subordinated or released its mortgages. (Tr. 128)
On the contrary, he testified that many factors concerning Nalder and his credit and business reputation were
under investigation and that other indispensable conditions imposed by his company were never complied with.
For inst;nce, N alder, Jr. was to be strictly limited to
5,000 turkeys, not 9,000 or 14,000. (Tr. 115, 121) He
was to secure his application by a guarantee which was
never obtained and without which the application would
not have been approved. (Tr. 115, 116, 126, 127, 133)
The credit reputation of Nalder, Jr. was under serious
question. (Ex. F 6) (Tr. 111, 122) He presented a poor
paying record and was involved in litigation and had
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numerous mortgages and debts of record in considerable
amounts in addition to the mortgages in the name of
defendant as mortgagee. (Tr. 117, 122-124) It could be
argued that this application ccdied on the vine" because
Nalder, Jr. never got the subordination or the guarantee,
but there is no justification in the record for assuming or
inferring that even if he had obtained these documents,
the application would have been approved. It is certain
that nothing in the record justified the trial court in permitting the jury to speculate that Nalder, Jr's. application failed because of defendant's unreleased mortgages.
A fair inference from the evidence in this record leads
irresistibly to the conclusion that the application would
never have been approved. The testimony of Nalder, Jr.,
himself, shows that his credit was so bad that he could
not even borrow $352.00 with which he could have had
a subordination from defendant. (Tr. 302, 324)
Nalder, Sr. made applications to Ralston Purina
Company in 1952, 1953 and 1954. All that the record
shows concerning the 1953 application was that it was
for 1,300 to 1,500 turkeys (Tr. 156, 204) and that it
was not approved.
In 1952 the application of Nalder, Sr. was for credit
for 5,000 turkeys. (Ex. G 2) It, too, was rejected. In
1954, the application was for 2,000 turkeys. (Ex. G 3)
Both the latter applications were not accepted.
The record is clear that all applications made by
Nalder, Sr. were turned down for much the same reasons
that Nalder, Jr's. application to General Mills was denied.
His credit rating was poor, (Ex. L 11, 13, 14) (Tr. 96,
478-82, 499, 508, 509), he lacked the character and reputation which Ralston Purina thought one of their credit
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risks should possess, (Ex. L 15), there were numerous
mortgages and judgments in favor of other creditors
in addition to defendant's mortgages, which were of'
record (Tr. 492, 493). Other factors played their part in
these rejections. (Tr. 499, 510, 511)
The Ralston Purma credit manager testified positively that it was not defendant's unreleased mortgages
which were responsible for a denial of Nalder, Sr.'s credit
applications. (Tr. 497, 500) Of course, it was conceded
that a release or subordination of defendant's mortgages
would have been necessary to the approval of an application. But here again the record in no sense justifies the
conclusion that defendant's unreleased mortgages were
the cause or the reason why Nalder, Sr.'s applications
were turned down, or that if they had been released the
applications would have been approved.
The burden of proof, resting as it did upon the
plaintiffs, required them to prove by competent evidence
that any application which was made by either Nalder,
Sr. or Nalder, Jr. would have been granted if defendant
had released or subordinated its mortgages, and that solely
because those mortgages were not released, the plaintiffs
were unable to get credit. We submit it was not enough
for plaintiffs to prove that the failure of the defendant
to release combined with other reasons, as in a case involving the concurrent acts of joint tort feasors.
The contentions of the defendant in this regard are
well grounded in the authorities. In the case of Ebbert v.
First National Bank of Condon, (Ore.) 279 Pac. 534, a
case closely analogous to this case, the plaintiff was likewise claiming damages because of the alleged wrongful
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refusal of the defendant bank to release some chattel
mortgages. The court makes these observations:
((The recovery of the item of $37,808.08 was
ventured upon the contention._that the defendant
wrongfully and purposely failed to satisfy the
mortgage records and thereby caused the OregonWashington Joint Stock Land Bank of Portland
to reject his application for a mortgage loan in the
sum of $25,000.00 Before that incident could become an element of damages, it was necessary that
the evidence should show (a) that in the absence
of the wrongful act there was a reasonable likelihood that the loan would have been made, and
(b) that the defendant's neglect caused the rejection of the application."
In that case many of the factors were present that
are present in this case. For instance, in that case there
was a whole series of chattel mortgages which the plaintiff had not mentioned, including unpaid taxes. After
considering all of the elements the court stated:
H

~·

* :-'" Such a remote possibility of injury is

too uncertain to be recoverable as damages. Sutherland on Damages (4th Ed.) 53 ; Sedgwick on
Damages (8th Ed.) Sec. 170. The following apt
language of Mr. Justice McBride in Spain v~
Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 78 Or. 355,
153 P. 470, 475, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 1104, is applicable: (When the evidence leaves the case in
such a situation that the jury will be required to
speculate and guess which of several possible causes
occasioned the injury, that part of the case should
be withdrawn from their consideration.'"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

46

See also Shealy's Inc. v. So. Bell Tel. 5 Tel. Co., 126 Fed.
Supp. 382.
In United States v. Huff, 175 Fed. 2d. 678, the
plaintiff claimed damages for lost sheep and goats because
of destroyed fences. The court in that case said:
ult therefore becomes patent that the evidence
as to the loss of these -animals in each case fails to
rise above mere speculation and guess.
uwhile it may be inviting to approve the trial
court's :findings and allow at least a partial recovery for such losses, it remains our solemn duty
under this evidence to disallow these unproved
claims, as it is well settled that speculative damages
are not recoverable. It was incumbent upon these
plaintffs to adduce some clear and convincing
proof of specific losses resulting solely from the
Government's failure to repair and maintain the
fences and this they have signally failed to do."
See also:

Addison-Miller, Inc. v. U. S., 70 Fed. Supp. 893
William H. Schwanke, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., (Wis.)
227 N. W. 30

Tribune Co. v. Bradshaw, (Ill.), 20 Ill. App. 17
Stevens v. Yale, (Mich.) 72 N. W. 5
Winston Cigarette Machine Co. v. Wells-Whitehead Tobacco Co., (N.C.) 53 S. E. 885
Murray v. Texas Co., (S.C.) 174 S. E. 231
Harmon v. Western Union Tel. Co., (S. C.) 43
S. E. 959
This court has spoken unmistakably in cases similar
to this one in which several causes or explanations of an
injury are involved, only one of which may be attributed
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to the wrong or negligence of the defendant, and has held
that in such cases it must be shown that the loss or damage
claimed would not have occurred if the particular wrong
attributed to the defendant had not been committed.

Jenson v. S. H. Kress f5 Co., 87 Utah 434, 49
Pac. 2d 958
Tremelling v. So. Pac. Co., 257 Pac. 1066, 70
Utah 72
Virend v. Utah Ore-Sampling Co., 48 Utah 398,
160 Pac. 115
Quinn v. Utah Gas and Coke Co., 42 Utah 113,
129 Pac. 362
Inasmuch as there were numerous factors involved
in this case which just as effectively could have prevented,
and, we think did prevent, these plaintiffs from securing
their :financing in 1952, 1953 and 1954 as the existence of
defendant's recorded mortgages, there was no proof of
proximate cause. The evidence in the record fails to eliminate all factors which existed as possible reasons for the
rejection of the applications, except the alleged wrong
of the defendant. It is submitted that in this case there
is no showing of proximate cause and that the judgment
rendered by the court rests upon speculation and guess
and cannot be permitted to stand.
POINT VII

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT ACTED
IN GOOD FAITH.
Evidence supporting the above proposition is found
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in the testimony of witnesses Quinney, Williams and Aust.
(Tr. 336, 337,357,377,432,433,434,444,448,449,462)
There is nothing in the record contradicting this testimony. This being the only evidence on the question of
good faith, the jury should have been directed that the
good faith of the defendant was established. The verdict
and judgment, contrary to this testimony, is against the
evidence and hence is reversible error.
This court in Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, supra,
denied recovery in a case where damages were claimed
because a mortgagee did not release a mortgage. In that
case the record showed that in refusing to release the
mortgage the mortgagee was acting on the advice of its
attorney. This court, referring to Section 57-3-8, UCA
1953, says the following:
uThe above statute is penal in nature and
should be strictly construed. It is not meant to
penalize one who honestly, though mistakenly, refuses to release or discharge a mortgage of record
because he believes that there has been no full
satisfaction. Under the facts and circumstances
of this case where the bank, relying upon the advice of an attorney, honestly thinking that it had
valid and subsisting mortgages against the appellant which had not been satisfied, refused to
release the mortgages, it was acting in good faith
and was, therefore, not liable for damages under
the above section."
There is proof in the record from which it conclusively
appears that defendant was relying on the advice of its
counsel. It must be presumed in the absence of contrary
evidence that defendant acted in good faith when it was
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following a policy with regard to releasing mortgages
laid down by its counsel as a business procedure to protect the best interests of the defendant. The policy was,
to retain all mortgages as long as there was unpaid indebtedness owing to the defendant.
To overcome the overwhelming effect of· the testimony of defendant's witnesses concerning its policy and
the advice given it by counsel relating to releasing mortgages, plaintiffs attempted to show oppressive conduct
on the part of the defendant in requiring excessive security and the alleged threats attributed to the witness Williams that the defendant would prevent the plaintiffs
from obtaining any further credit. They further assert
that defendant's demand for the payment of $352.00 to
be applied upon a debt of over $5,000.00 as a condition to
giving a subordination agreement is evidence that defendant was acting in bad faith. We have already sufficiently answered the :first two contentions by showing
indisputable evidence that there was no duplicate :financing
and that the threats claimed were nothing but the figment
of the plaintiffs' imagination. We shall give what we bebelieve to be a complete answer to the final contention
hereafter.

POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION THAT SCOVILLE AND
SCHINKER PROMISED OR AGREED ON BEHALF
OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE MORTGAGES
WITH NO PRELIMINARY SHOWING OF AGENCY
OR AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH PROMISE AND
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FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMOMY ESTABLISHES THAT
SCOVILLE AND SCHINKER HAD NO SUCH
AUTHORITY.
The court permitted the plaintiffs to testify to
promises or agreements supposedly made by one Scoville
and Schinker relating to the release of the 1949 chattel
mortgage and to defendant's agreement to accept the
real estate mortgage of August 15, 1950, as payment of
all prior mortgages and other alleged representations relating to the release of the 1950 chattel mortgage. The
plaintiffs' contentions in this regard are found in the
transcript at pages 42, 60-62, 214-216 and 318. There
is nothing in the record showing that either Scoville or
Schinker had authority to make the promises or representations attributed to them with respect to these matters. Williams, defendant's general manager, specifically
testified that these individuals had no such authority.
(Tr. 44-54, 314, 315, 338, 339, 342) The correctness of
Williams' testimony is corroborated by Exhibits C 9 and
C 10. By Exhibit C 10 the plaintiffs were informed
directly by defendant that no release of mortgage would
be obtained without authority from Mr. Williams and
Exhibits C 4, 5, 6, 7. 5 and 8 all show that Scoville in
securing the signature on the real estate mortgage of
August 15, 1950, (Ex. A 10) was acting solely as a messenger.
This court has many times passed upon the question
of the proof required to establish agency to bind a principle. In Witherow l-'. Mystic Toilers, 42 Utah 360, 130
Pac. 58, this court says:
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((Of course agency cannot be shown by declarations of the agent. And, before declarations
of the agent may be received as admissions against
his principal, the agency and the authority of the
agent must first be shown. Here neither was shown.
Nor is it true, as the court seems to indicate in the
charge, that declarations of an agent, to show
agency, go merely to the question of sufficiency
of the evidence to show such relation, and hence
may be considered for such purpose, in connection
with other evidence. The authorities, we think, are
to the effect that such evidence is incompetent
for such purpose, and that the fact of agency
must be established by evidence dehors the declarations of the agent."
In Jenson v. S. H. Kress fS Co., supra, plaintiff was
permitted to testify to a hearsay statement of a former
employee of the defendant without a showing that the
statement made was binding on the defendant because
made in the course of employment or under authority.
It was held that the statement testified to by plaintiff
was hearsay and was not binding upon the defendant.
See Booth v. Nelson, 61 Utah 239, 211 Pac. 985, and 20
Am. Jr. P. 508, Sec. 598, and Cole v. Myers (Conn.)
21 Atl. 2d 396.
It is submitted that all of the evidence in this case
relating to the alleged promises or agreements asserted to
have been made by Scoville and Schinker relating to releasing chattel mortgages or to accepting the real estate
mortgage (Ex. A 10) in satisfaction of the 1949 real
estate and chattel mortgages was inadmissible without the
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tions were made with defendant's authority, and defendant's exception should have been allowed.

POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT,
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT
AND FOR A NEW TRIAL.
At the proper time in the trial proceedings defendant made its motion for a directed verdict. (Tr. 514)
At that time the trial court expressed doubt that plaintiffs had proved causll connection between the acts of
defendant and the alleged loss or damage claimed or that
there was adequate proof of damage. (Tr. 516) However, this motion was denied after judgment was entered
on the verdict, as were defendant's motions for judgment
notwithstanding verdict or for a new trial. By its .requested instructions B and C defendant also asked the
court to direct a verdict against the plaintiffs, Nalder, Sr.
and Nalder, Jr. All of these motions were denied.
The basis for the motion for directed verdict is that
there is no com pet en t or sufficient evidence in this record
to sustain a finding that defendant, in failing to release
its mortgages, destroyed the credit of plaintiffs; that
defendant had a right to maintain all of its mortgages
of record; that there is no proof that failure to release
mortgages was the proximate cause of damage to plaintiffs; that at all times complained of defendant was willing and offered to subordinate its mortgages to any concern willing to advance credit to plaintiffs; that the
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counting of $3 52.00 for turkeys illegally sold by plaintiff, Nalder, Jr., in violation of the terms of the defendant's 1951 chattel mortgage, as a condition to delivering
such a subordination agreement; that no proper demand
was made upon defendant for a release; that the evidence
is conclusive that defendant acted in good faith in not releasing its mortgages which is a complete defense to plaintiffs' action, and there is no competent evidence of bad
faith; that there is no competent evidence of any damage having been sustained by plaintiffs and the evidence
on damages is speculative, uncertain, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and was admitted without proper
foundation.
All of the matters have been fully argued under
the preceding points of this brief and no useful purpose
can be served in their repetition.
It is submitted that the motions made and each of
them should have been granted and the denial thereof
was error.
POINT X
THE COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN OF ITS
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AND IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE CERTAIN OF DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.
It is the contention of defendant that fundamental
and prejudicial error was committed by the trial court
in his instructions to the jury. Exceptions were taken to
specific instructions complained of. (Tr. 536-539)
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termine whether Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr. were partners in 1952, 1953 and 1954 and if they so found to
assess a single verdict in favor of both plaintiffs. This instruction ignored completely the determination by this
court on the former appeal that Nalder, Jr. quit the turkey business in 1952 and turned to other pursuits. This
court also decided that N alder, Jr. could recover no
damages after he left the business of raising turkeys. We
have fully set out defendant's views with respect to this
subject under Point I hereof and rely upon the arguments therein set out.
Instruction No. 7 concerned itself with the elements
of damage which the jury was instructed might be considered in the event the issues were found in plaintiffs'
favor. All the elements of damage referred to in said instruction were in the realm of speculation because the
evidence which the jury had to consider in determining
these matters was inadmissible and insufficient to support
a claim of damages. Under point V of this brief the
reasons why this evidence was inadmissible are argued at
length. Based upon the reasons therein stated it is submitted the instruction was erroneous. This instruction
was likewise improper because, as pointed out under
Point VI of this brief the jury was improperly permitted
to find the issues in plaintiffs' favor when there is no
proof that defendant's actions proximately caused the
damage claimed by plaintiffs.
Defendant excepted to the giving of instruction
No. 12 because it ignored the defense of good faith upon
which defendant was entitled to rely. Under Point VII
of this brief appears the argument of defendant with
respect to this defense. This instruction should have at
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least been modified to the extent of informing the jury
that even though it might appear by a preponderance
of the evidence that plaintiffs could not get financing
because of defendant's unreleased mortgages, the verdict
should nevertheless be for the defendant, if the jury
found that the defendant acted in good faith.
Furthermore, this instruction was contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence in that the real
estate mortgages were never in fact satisfied and because
the chattel mortgages secured the unpaid debt of plaintiffs and consequently plaintiffs were not entitled to demand releases. Under Points II and III of this brief appear
all of the arguments which sustain defendant's objections to this instruction.
The defendant objected to the giving of instruction
No. 13 relating to the sufficiency of a demand for a
release of mortgage. The basis of this objection is the lack
of any evidence of a demand for such releases ever having been made by plain tiffs. It is clear that no demand
for release of real estate mortgages was ever made. See
arguments under Point II of this brief. Under Point III of
this brief appears the argument that there is no evidence
of any demand made by plaintiffs for release of chattel
mortgages prior to 1954. For the reasons stated under
Points II and III the giving of instruction No. 13 was
error.
Instruction No. 14 given by the court embodied
plaintiffs' request No. 4. It instructed the jury on the
various modes in which a mortgage may be satisfied, including merger in a later or subsequent mortgage.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record that a
merger of any of the mortgages involved in this case ever
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occurred or was intended to occur. Therefore, it is submitted that the instruction was a mere abstract statement of a legal principle unsupported by any evidence in
the record. The giving of such an instruction was error.
Most grievous error was committed by the trial court
in giving instruction No. 16. Plaintiffs' counsel invited
the court into this error by his request No. 6 (a), which
was given as requested.
In substance the instruction advised the jury that
more than one proximate cause might exist and that if
the acts or omissions of two or more persons work concurrently to cause an injury each act or omission may be
regarded as a proximate cause.
In the first place the plaintiffs predicated the whole
theory of their case upon the proposition that it was the
act of defendant in failing or refusing to release mortgages which was the sole cause of plaintiffs' injury or
damage. Therefore, the instruction given by the trial
court was contrary to and in contradiction of plaintiffs'
theory. Furthermore, the instruction assumed the existence of other causes brought about by the wrongful acts
of third parties. There was no evidence of any wrong
or act committed by a third party which, acting concurrently with the acts of defendant, jointly caused damages to plaintiffs. This instruction had no proper place
in this case. It is an instruction which is applicable to a
negligence case in which the evidence may justify a finding that more than one person caused an injury. Instead
of giving this instruction the court should have instructed
the jury that before a verdict could be rendered for plaintiffs they were required to find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the acts of defendant were the sole
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proximate cause of injury to plaintiffs. Under Point VI
appear the arguments and authorities holding that in a
case where more than one cause of damage may exist only
one of which is chargeable to the defendant, before a verdict may be reached the jury must :find that the injury
was caused solely by the wrong of the defendant. Until
the jury was able to say from the preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiffs' credit applications would
have been granted if defendant had released its various
mortgages no recovery in favor of the plaintiffs could
be permitted. That the record in this case fails to show
that any applications of plaintiffs would have been
granted if defendant had released is abundantly demonstrated in this record.
After instructing the jury in instruction No. 17 that
good faith constitutes a defense in an action for refusing
to release a mortgage, the court proceeded by paragraph
three of that instruction to advise the jury that if defendant was not rightfully insisting upon an additional
payment as a condition to releasing its mortgages, then
defendant was not acting in good faith. It is submitted
that a creditor may mistakenly demand a payment he
is not entitled to which would not be right and yet still
act in perfect good faith in making the demand.
This part of the instruction was highly prejudicial
and erroneous. In the first place, there is no evidence to
support the instruction that defendant was motivated by
a desire to coerce or by other improper motives. It is
not disputed by plaintiffs that they were in debt to the
defendant for over $5 ,000.00. Much less than 10% of
this sum was requested in consideration of giving a subordination agreement. Defendant had a right to demand
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payment of its entire debt which was then owing and
had been owing for three years. Believing as it did, that
its mortgages were not satisfied and acting upon the advice of its counsel not to release its mortgages, which is
undisputed and uncontradicted, it could, without acting
in bad faith, impose conditions upon its giving of a release or subordination agreement. Demanding a token
payment on a debt is not wrongful.
In addition, the amount demanded represented the
value of turkeys mortgaged to the defendant in 1951
which Nalder, Jr. wrongfully and illegally disposed of to
pay his gas bill. The mortgage (Ex. A 3) required plaintiffs to account to defendant for the proceeds of all
turkeys raised with the feed and money supplied by defendant. The evidence instead of showing any wrong
or oppressive action in demanding an accounting for those
turkeys shows the leniency of defendant in not demanding payment of the entire balance owing from plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs recognized that the demand made by defendant was reasonable. (Ex. D 17, 19) (Tr. 301, 302,
323, 154, 155) It should be remembered that at the time
defendant was willing to subordinate its mortgages it
could have commenced proceedings to foreclose. Instead
of doing so it waited for three years in the vain hope
that plaintiffs would make an honest effort to pay their
debt. It was only after the defendant insisted upon payment that this unwarranted and unjustified action was
commenced. Here again plaintiffs' counsel led the court
into reversible error by his requested Instruction No. 10.
Instruction No. 18 contains the same basic defects
as Instruction No. 16. It is the embodiment of plaintiffs'
request No. 6 (b). This instruction permitted the jury
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to speculate that wrongful acts committed by third persons, not parties to the action, may have combined with
the acts of the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiffs.
There is absolutely no evidence of any wrong committed
by any third party. Therefore, the instruction had no
basis in the evidence before the court. Furthermore, it
was an improper instruction because not applicable to
this case. It is an instruction frequently encountered in
personal injury cases where joint or concurrent acts of
negligence have produced an injury.
It is submitted that the instruction as applied to this
case was misleading and was calculated to produce in the
mind of the jury the impression that the court believed
the defendant and others in some way, not disclosed by
any evidence, caused injury to the plaintiffs. Here again
the jury should have been instructed that where there are
several possible explanations for a cause of injury only
one of which may be attributed to the defendant, then it
must affirmatively appear that the damage complained
of would not have occurred except for the conduct of
the defendant.
Objection was made to instruction No. 19 which
stated that any notice to Schinker and Aust that plaintiffs had made a demand for release of mortgages was
notice to defendant. It is submitted that there is insufficient evidence of any notice having been brought to
the attention of Aust or Schinker. Therefore, there was
no basis for the giving of this instruction.
The court refused defendant's requests No. 1, 6 and
14 which defendant submits was error.
Defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed
that the filing of a suit by plaintiffs created no inference
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that plaintiffs were entitled to recover. This is a correct
statement of the law and was applicable to this case. The
denial of defendant's request No. 1 was error.
Defendant's request No. 6 was based upon the theory
that the jury could properly find from the evidence that
the plaintiffs' turkey raising business was unestablished
and hence they could claim no damages for its alleged
destruction or injury. The law is well settled as shown
by the authorities set out under Point IV that no damages for lost profits to an unestablished business or one
merely in contemplation may be recovered. The evidence
in the case shows that the turkey raising venture of
plainiffs was precarious, unsuccessful and not possessing
the degree of permanence and stability to justify any
claim for damages by reason of loss of alleged profits.
By its request No. 14 defendant requested that the
jury be instructed that before any action for damages
for failure to release mortgages could be maintained a
demand was essential. This instruction the court did not
give. This was error as appears from the authorities and
argument under Point II of this brief. The issue of demand was one of the vital and important issues involved
in this case to which much of this record is devoted. It
being the contention of the defendant that the record
discloses that no demand for releases was ever made by
plaintiffs, the instruction requested on this important
issue should have been given. It is submitted that the
record amply justifies the requested instruction.

POINT XI
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING CERTAIN
ITEMS OF DEFENDANT'S COST BILL ON APPEAL.
Following the order reversing the judgment on the
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former appeal in which defendant was awarded costs, defendant filed its cost bill for items incurred in that appeal. (R. 23) Among the items claimed was the sum
of $682.84 which represented the premium defendant
was required to pay for an appeal and supersedeas bond.
That judgment was for over $90,000.00. The supersedeas
was necessary because following the entry of that judgment the plaintiffs commenced garnishment proceedings
to attach the accounts of the defendant. Also included
in that cost bill was the item of $19.80 for filing the
record on appeal. Both items of costs referred to were
necessarily incurred by defendant in prosecuting said appeal. Under rule 54d ( 3) these costs should have been
allowed. See Everts v. Barker, 58 Utah 519, 200 Pac. 473.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case establishes that plaintiffs
are indebted to defendant for the amount demanded in
defendant's answer and counterclaim. On the other hand,
the record clearly demonstrates that defendant was fully
entitled to retain all mortgages of record, and that it did
so acting in good faith and upon advice of counsel.
There is a complete failure of proof that the existence
of defendant's mortgages upon the records was the cause
of plaintiffs' alleged losses and the judgment in plaintiffs'
favor is founded upon incompetent evidence of damage.
Judgment was granted in favor of H. William Nalder,
Jr. for failure to release real estate mortgages not signed
or executed by him and after he had abandoned the
turkey business.
For all of the reasons referred to in this brief the
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judgment should be reversed with directions to enter
judgment for defendant for the amount due upon its
mortgage and to enter a decree of foreclosure and order
of sale and dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
ALBERT R. BOWEN,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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